The Arctic is changing, as is the threat landscape along Europe’s northern frontier. Russia, with its aggressive foreign policy posture, is expanding its military presence in the region, while the United States, long regarded as Europe’s primary security guarantor, shows growing disinterest in the European continent. In this uncertain environment, Norway, Sweden, and Finland must now assume greater responsibility for the defense of the High North. This article examines how these frontline states are equipped and preparing for a potential conflict with Russia, highlighting the key capabilities they contribute to Europe’s broader defense architecture.

Climate change is rapidly transforming the Arctic. As ice recedes, new opportunities and risks are emerging. Chief among these are economic prospects: melting ice is opening trade routes like the Northwest Passage and Northern Sea Route, which could shorten shipping times between Asia and Europe, bypass chokepoints like the Suez Canal, and lower transportation costs. The Arctic is also estimated to contain significant deposits of oil, natural gas, rare earth minerals, and fisheries resources, which heighten its geopolitical importance. [1]

Major powers, especially China, the United States, and Russia, are positioning themselves strategically to be the first beneficiaries of these developments. China, calling itself a “near-Arctic” state, holds observer status in the Arctic Council and invests heavily through its Polar Silk Road initiative to secure a credible Arctic claim. As Russia is currently attempting to expand its territory westwards into Ukraine, it is at the same time leveraging its large Arctic population and Cold War-era military base infrastructure to underpin its Arctic ambitions.

For Europe, these shifts could have significant implications. U.S. unpredictability, as seen in Trump’s Greenland remarks, [3] JD Vance’s Munich speech, [4] the Trump-Zelenskyy White House meeting, [5] leaked Signal chats, [6] and tariff uncertainty, [7] is further complicating Europe’s situation, raising questions about U.S. reliability as a partner. European states must boost collective security, not just on the Eastern Flank but also in the Arctic, where global rivalry is intensifying too.

Norway

As the only European state with both land and sea borders with Russia in the Arctic, Norway holds a key position in the High North. Its northern areas face Russia’s Kola Peninsula, where Russia’s second-strike submarines are based, putting it on the Arctic frontline. [8] Norway’s strategic role is reinforced by disputes over the Svalbard archipelago [9] [10] and its major gas exports from the Norwegian Continental Shelf and the Barents Sea. [11]

Norway maintains a relatively small but capable force of around 25,300 active personnel and 40,000 Home Guard reservists. [12] The core of the Norwegian Army is the Brigade Nord, a mechanized formation and the only brigade-sized unit within the force. [13] The Finnmark Land Command, stationed in the border region of Finnmark, serves as Norway’s first line of defense against a Russian attack. Analysts generally agree that Norway cannot independently repel a full-scale Russian invasion, its strategy emphasizes land power in the High North to delay aggression and allow time for allied reinforcements to arrive. [14] [15] However, structural limitations persist: armored and artillery units are concentrated in Brigade Nord, [13] and the overall number of main battle tanks, specifically, older Leopard 2A4 models (~36), and K9 Thunder self-propelled howitzers (~24) remains limited. [12]

To address these significant gaps, the Norwegian Ministry of Defense announced plans in 2024 to expand the Army with two additional brigades. One will be entirely new, the Brigade South, and one will be an upgrade of the existing Finnmark unit to full brigade size, [16] which will, for example, also be equipped with artillery. [17] Further plans include the procurement of 54 new Leopard 2A8 NOR tanks to ensure the necessary increase in quantities and improvement of the quality of the Army’s equipment. [18] While medium-range and point-defense systems are available when it comes to air defense, longer-range systems are completely absent in Norway’s current inventory, [12] leaving it vulnerable to long-range Russian strikes.

In the maritime domain, Norway’s Royal Navy balances strategic necessity with resource constraints. It operates four Fridtjof Nansen-class frigates and six aging Ula-class diesel-electric submarines, [12] [19] the latter slated for replacement by the more capable Type 212CD class within the next few years. [16] However, maritime security is complicated by Svalbard’s remoteness and vulnerability. The Coast Guard’s sole icebreaker, [20] although essential, remains a limited asset in crisis scenarios because of the vast Arctic waters that it needs to cover. A standout capability is the Marjata IV, [21] an advanced intelligence collection vessel enhancing Norway’s situational awareness in Arctic waters.

Norway’s Air Force offers its most modern and capable assets to national and alliance defense. With 52 fifth-generation F-35A Lightning II fighters [22] and five P-8A Poseidon maritime patrol aircraft, [12] Norway possesses advanced aerial and anti-submarine warfare capabilities. [23] [24] [25] However, this technological edge comes with a deeper structural dependency: both platforms are U.S.-made. Norway’s ability to operate independently in prolonged conflict scenarios is thus partially contingent upon continued American supply and political will.

Norwegian forces are well integrated into NATO structures and contribute significantly to Arctic expertise. They host NATO’s Centre of Excellence for Cold Weather Operations and participate regularly in NATO’s joint exercises. [26] [27] [28]

Sweden

Despite lacking both an Arctic coastline and a direct border with Russia, Sweden’s vast northern territory, proximity to the Barents region, and deep cooperation with Nordic neighbors [29] place it at the center of European Arctic security, enabling it to serve as a strategic rear area for operations and a key hub for regional defense coordination.

Sweden’s armed forces consist of around 14,850 active-duty troops and 21,500 Home Guard reservists. [12] Without direct access to Arctic waters, Sweden’s Navy plays a more limited direct role in Arctic operations, focusing primarily on Baltic defense, especially around the island of Gotland. [30] However, its forces contribute through regional interoperability and maritime mobility along the northern axis.

The core of the Swedish Army consists of two mechanized brigades. Sweden’s land forces have access to 110 Leopard 2A5 main battle tanks (Strv 122), over 300 CV9040 (Strf 9040) infantry fighting vehicles, and a variety of other tracked vehicles, [12] [31] which are an important asset in the North, as tracked vehicles offer better mobility in snow-covered or frozen terrain typical of sub-Arctic regions. [32] [33] The artillery battalions use 26 Archer self-propelled howitzers [34] [35] and a mix of mortar systems. The air defense umbrella spans further than that of the other two, including modern platforms such as Patriot PAC-3 MSE and IRIS-T SLS, [12] capable of countering a broad range of incoming missiles.

Despite its advanced capabilities and larger equipment stocks, Sweden’s Army (~6,850) remains smaller than Norway’s (~8,300). But like Norway, Sweden plans to add two brigades, which will be sub-Arctic mechanized units, [36] underscoring the High North’s growing strategic importance.

The Swedish Air Force fields a capable and, by European standards, relatively large fleet of fighter aircraft. [37] Its core consists of 96 domestically produced JAS 39C/D Gripen multirole fighters. [12] While the more advanced JAS 39E Gripen is undergoing testing, there are ongoing discussions about extending the service life of the C/D variants to maintain readiness. [38]

In 2024, Sweden ended its long-standing non-alignment policy by joining NATO, [39] following a 2023 Defense Cooperation Agreement with the United States granting American forces access to 17 military sites, including key northern air bases like Luleå and Kiruna. [40] Even after joining NATO, Sweden benefits from its long-standing strategic autonomy and reliance on domestically developed systems, such as the Gripen fighter and Archer howitzer, which means it is less structurally embedded than its neighbors, Norway and Finland. This self-sufficiency could prove to be an asset if U.S. engagement in European defense were to decrease, offering Sweden a greater degree of resilience in an increasingly uncertain transatlantic environment.

Finland

Finland holds a strategic position in the High North, with its most northern region, Lapland, extending into the Arctic Circle and a 1,340-kilometer border with Russia. To protect its territory under these geographic circumstances, Finland maintains a military that differs significantly from Norway’s and Sweden’s armed forces.

Finland’s defense efforts stand out with a strong emphasis on the concept of total defense and a robust reserve structure. [41] Around 23,850 active-duty personnel are maintained in peacetime, [12] with a wartime strength of approximately 280,000 mobilized personnel, drawing from a much larger reserve pool. [41]

Tracked mobility forms the core of Finland’s land forces, optimized for operations in forested and Arctic environments. For its wartime capacity of 180,000 soldiers, the Army provides around 200 main battle tanks (Leopard 2A4 and Leopard 2A6 variants), supported by over 200 tracked infantry fighting vehicles (CV9030FIN and Cold-War era BMP-2MD) and nearly 320 tracked armored personnel carriers (Soviet-made MT-LBu variants). [12] These tracked assets offer essential mobility in snow and on frozen ground, which are typical conditions of Lapland and northern Finland.

Specialized Arctic capability is concentrated in the Jaeger Brigade based in Lapland, which maintains a permanent readiness force for operations in the northern region. The Brigade trains troops specifically for reconnaissance, ranger, anti-tank, and logistics missions under extreme conditions. [42]

Artillery remains a cornerstone of Finnish land power, with a large number of systems providing long-range fires, including modernized self-propelled K9 Thunder howitzers and multiple rocket launchers. [12] Finland continues to expand precision strike capabilities to support mobile operations across the vast northern landscape. An issue is the lack of medium- and long-range air defense systems. [12] Proximity to Russia decreases the need for such systems a bit but because of Russia’s size, such platforms would still be required for an adequate missile defense setup. 

In the air domain, Finland’s Air Force operates a modern fleet of 62 F/A-18C/D Hornet multirole fighters equipped with a range of missiles, including the long-range AGM-158 JASSM cruise missile. [12] The Lappland Air Wing, based in Rovaniemi, is one of two main air wings, providing surveillance and air policing capabilities over Northern Finland and serving as the primary northern air defense node. [43] A transition to 64 F-35A Lightning II aircraft is underway, [44] which will significantly strengthen Finland’s aerial capabilities.

Finland’s reliance on U.S.-produced aircraft and munitions raises concerns in light of recent American unpredictability. [45] Additionally, the Finnish base and logistics infrastructure leaves the North highly isolated, with most bases located in the South, particularly around Helsinki. [46] This complicates rapid responses and logistics in a crisis in the High North. Finland also operates 20 NH90 TTH helicopters providing medium transport capability, but these models had so many reliability problems, that Norway and Sweden cancelled their contracts for the helicopters, [47] leaving a significant hole in Finland’s logistical capabilities.

Conclusion

Norway, Sweden, and Finland find themselves in similar situations: Each is playing a vital but incomplete role in Europe’s Arctic security. Norway excels in air and maritime domains, though its land forces are too small and lack sufficient modern materiel for sustained conflict. The small but capable Norwegian force is highly integrated into alliance structures and offers valuable Arctic warfighting expertise. However, long-standing dependence on U.S.-made equipment, especially in the air domain, leaves Norway vulnerable to growing uncertainty in transatlantic relations. Ongoing efforts to expand the military and modernize its systems are crucial steps toward greater resilience and close the gaps in quantity and quality that it has compared to the other two countries.

Sweden, by contrast, sets a strong example of self-sufficiency and defense production. Its forces are well-equipped across branches, fielding competitive, homegrown systems. However, despite having the largest population of the three, Sweden’s military is the smallest, with limited scalability through a relatively modest reserve. Nevertheless, Sweden would be an essential contributor of high-end systems and critical mass in a crisis. Its model of defense autonomy underlines the importance of maintaining indigenous capabilities as Europe strengthens its security posture.

Finland offers the most resilient force structure. It possesses, by far, the largest reserve pool and the ability to rapidly scale up active-duty forces in a crisis. Finland’s strategy of storing large quantities of modern equipment ensures that newly mobilized troops can be effectively armed. However, like Norway, Finland faces logistical challenges bridging the populated south with the Arctic north and, like Norway, is partly dependent on U.S. systems.

None of these countries can, on their own, secure their northern flank in a major Arctic conflict, though Finland comes closest. Collectively, they present a credible but still fragile deterrent. Their examples highlight key lessons for Europe at large: the importance of scaling forces, ensuring the sustainability of materiel, investing in hardened infrastructure, and building deeper regional integration.

As Europe enters an era of increased defense spending, these three nations illustrate both the strengths to build on and the vulnerabilities that must be addressed. Finland and Sweden offer complementary models, one of scale and readiness and the other of self-sufficiency, which not only Norway but all of Europe would do well to study. Arctic security, just as European security, will depend not on external assurances, but on Europe’s own ability to build a resilient, self-reinforcing shield, anchored in northern capabilities and backed by broader continental strength.

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Article reviewed by Dávid Dinič and Tomáš Zwiefelhofer

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